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hat do the Pope, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of 
China and the World Bank president have in common? We learn 
from Gokcekus’ new book that all three have recently declared a war 
against a common enemy: corruption, which is the subject matter of this book. 
Obviously, the result of this last round is too early to call yet. However, it is 
difficult to say that efforts to combat corruption have borne fruit so far. All 
indicators are showing that the world is becoming a more corrupt place. This is bad 
news because corruption’s widespread negative impact reverberates throughout 
society and disproportionately hurts the poor, worsening the problems of poverty 
and social inequality, another global menace which has been on the rise.  
So is there a silver lining? One of the premises of this book is that 
understanding the dynamics of corruption may help policy makers, researchers and 
advocates of good governance come up with better tools to combat corruption, and 
that’s what exactly the book aims for: Contributing to our knowledge on 
corruption. It does this by questioning and refining the assumptions and methods of 
existing approaches, and by focusing on areas which are often neglected by more 
conventional studies, in seven neat chapters.  
The book can be seen as a compilation of Gokcekus’ earlier works on 
corruption, which were published in peer-reviewed journals where econometric 
modeling and empirical analyses usually took precedence at the expense of policy 
implications of main findings. The book aims to make up for this by elaborating on 
the latter with a view to providing the practitioners and students of good 
governance with more ammunition in their anti-corruption efforts.     
After the introductory first chapter, Chapter Two dwells on different ways of 
quantifying corruption. Quantification is important because without it, it is 
impossible to make a sound cost-benefit analysis of anti-corruption efforts. In other 
words, we can never know whether an anti-corruption project is worth its cost or 
not unless we know the cost of corruption in the first place. To address this 
challenge, the author introduces two novel ideas. First, inspired by a freakonomics-
esque observation, he uses luxury car sales, an example of conspicuous 
consumption, which moves hand in hand with corrupt activities as a proxy to 
indirectly quantify corruption. His alternative method is designed to measure a 
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specific form of corruption, administrative corruption, and is based on comparing 
civil servants’ current salaries with the salaries they would demand to accept a 
similar job in the private sector.    
In the rest of the book, perception indicators of corruption are utilized to 
measure corruption. In Chapter Three, the author focuses on the connection 
between religion and corruption. Particularly, it is shown that what makes 
Protestant countries less corrupt is not the percentage of their current Protestant 
population but rather the percentage of Protestant population they had a hundred 
years ago, by using the framework offered by new institutional economics.    
Probably the most provocative argument of the book comes in Chapter Four 
where Gokcekus suggests that contrary to general belief, increasing the number of 
woman employees in the public agencies cannot decrease the level of corruption 
indefinitely – unless this is coupled with other corruption reducing measures. As 
exemplified by the case of Bulgaria, where an overwhelming majority of the public 
sector employees are women, after a certain point the trend turns around. Gokcekus 
accounts for this by introducing the notion of group dynamics in the environments 
where public officials operate in.  
Chapter Five is devoted to the relationship between corruption and openness i.e. 
the trade-to-GDP ratio. It is widely argued in literature that: increases in openness 
correspond to a decrease in corruption. Yet, the dynamics behind this connection 
remain, to a large extent, unaccounted for. Gokcekus posits that not only how much 
you trade, but also who you trade with (the quality of openness as he puts it) 
should be analyzed. He concludes that the reduction in corruption that comes with 
increasing openness would be greater if the trade increases occurred with less 
corrupt trading partners. He also shows, for instance, how increased trade with the 
EU lowered corruption in Africa via the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis, 
while trade with China either made corruption worse or had no effect at all. One 
important takeaway of this chapter is that the effect of openness on corruption will 
improve if governments of big exporters push their companies to improve their 
anti-corruption monitoring at the corporate level.  
If trading with the EU helps to reduce corruption in African countries, it is only 
intuitive to expect that joining the EU would reduce corruption in its new members 
too. Chapter Six tests this hypothesis to find out that, surprisingly, this expectation 
is simply misplaced. It turns out that the EU has become a more corrupt place after 
the joining of 12 new members. Given the importance of the EU in the global 
economy and politics, this finding is alarming and calls for the attention of 
Eurocrats.    
In the concluding Chapter Seven, where the relationship between corruption and 
the business cycle is analyzed, Gokcekus concludes that corruption rises in 
economic booms and calls for a cyclical anti-corruption approach, which will not 
only decrease corruption but also help avoid recession by limiting reckless 
behavior of economic actors.       
Though Peculiar Dynamics of Corruption is a product of rigorous econometric 
analysis, it is easily accessible to non-economists, and indeed one may easily 
succumb to reading it in one go. Each of the chapters follows a similar pattern: 
After lucidly reviewing various approaches and introducing the reader to 
discussions on the topic, the chapter ends with the contribution of the author to the 
broader debate and policy implications of this contribution. This makes the book 
perfect as a textbook to be used in public policy schools. The book is also useful 
for graduate students and the employees of public agencies or international 
organizations as well as policy-makers who need a quick introduction to cutting-
edge corruption research.     
On the downside, the readers with a more inquisitive mind may be disappointed 
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that the data and econometric models behind the findings in the book are not 
shown, but this is not a big shortcoming; they do have the chance to read the 
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